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Abstract - The objective of this research is to examine the role of managerial ability and monitoring structures as a mechanism to improve 
the earnings quality and the value of the firms listed in Indonesia’s Stock Exchange locally called Bursa Efek Indonesia (BEI). The sample 
used in this study was particularly all non-financial companies listed in Indonesia’s Stock Exchange. The sample was selected by purposive 
random sampling method. The number of sample collected was 178  companies. By using path analysis method, the results show that the 
managerial ability has positive and significant effect on the earnings quality and the value of the firm. Secondly, foreign ownership has no 
effect on the earnings quality, but it has a negative and significant effect on the value of the firm. Thirdly, the independent audit committee 
has a negative and significant effect on the earnings quality, but it has no effect on the value of the firm. Fourthly, the audit quality has a 
positive and significant effect on the earnings quality and the value of the firm. Fithly, the earnings quality has no effect on the value of the 
firm. In addition, by using Sobel test, it was found that  there was no mediating effects from the earnings quality in mediating the 
managerial ability and monitoring structures. 
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I. INTRODUCTION   
The stock price of a company can be considered as one indicator in judging the value of the company. The higher is the stock price 
of a company, the higher will be the value of a company, vice versa. One implication of this indicator is that a company will further 
lead to have a greater commitment to fulfill its social responsibilities. This study used the concept of value based on stakeholder 
theory based on a number of dimensions and performance of the company introduced by Harrison and Wicks (2013). Whilst the 
concept of value in this study refers to the concept of value of equity value advanced by Copeland, Koller and Murrin (1995). 
 
This study was conducted to examine the ability of managers in creating value for the company. Agency theory considers that the 
management of the company as an agent for stakeholders to maximize the welfare of stakeholders. The management company should 
have more information about the company's capacity and the overall working environment. For this reason, it is necessary to have a 
manager who has the ability to manage and design the business processes efficient and is able to make decisions that maximize profits 
and the value of the company (Libby and Luft, 1993). 
 
This study discusses the concept of supervision in two forms. The first is the surveillance aspect that covers the monitoring activity 
of the company through equity or ownership mechanism, where shareholders directly contribute to the process control in the form of 
shareholding companies. In this study, a form of control through the mechanism was particularly in the form of equity ownership by 
foreigners, whether individuals, legal entities, government and other status abroad (Dan Thi Duc, 2013). The second is in terms of the 
supervision aspects that cover monitoring activities in the internal and external environment of companies conducted by the high 
quality of independent audit committee and external auditors in the accounting process and the examination of annual financial 
statements. 
 
Duc and Thi (2013) states that foreign owners help companies to reduce agency problems and able to increase the value of the 
company. Foreign ownership becomes valuable when foreign owners play a good role in monitoring the shareholders. Companies that 
establish an independent audit committee will be able to report profits with less discretionary accruals than companies that do not have 
an independent audit committee (Klein, 2002; Baxter and Cotter, 2009). 
 
An independent financial audit is a monitoring device that aims to balance the asymmetry of information between managers and 
companies’ stakeholders companies (Herrbach, 2001). Teoh and Wong (1993) also showed that the big Public Accounting Firm 
(KAP) has great credibility so that the audit results produced tend to be stronger in response to increase the earnings and stock price. 
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This study focuses on the quality of earnings suggested by Penman (2001) in Abdelghany (2005) who defined that a sustainable 
earning is  the quality of earning of a company. This is due to the fact that sustainable profit is essential as investors focused on future 
earnings greater relative profits now. Sustainable profit can be said to be qualified as it reflects the company's ability to improve its 
operating activities to increase revenues in the future. 
 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
 There have been many studies advanced in the literature in this context.  Aier et al., (2005), for example,  found a negative 
relationship between the restatement to the financial expertise of CFO. Specifically,  they explained that companies that have a CFO 
with more work experience as CFO, MBA or CPA were significantly less likely to declare the restatement of earnings. Francis et al., 
(2008) considered the human dimension of managerial resources is important in explaining the quality of earnings. By using the 
concept of agency proposed by Fama (1980), it was found that the more famous CEOs tend to have poor earnings quality. These 
findings are not consistent with the view "efficient contracts" observed by Fama (1980) that the famous  CEO will take actions that 
generate quality earnings. 
 
Furthermore, Demerjian et al., (2012; 2013) proposed a measure of managerial ability based on the efficiency of managers in 
generating revenue. Managers who are better in understanding the trends of technology and industry are reliable to predict the demand 
of product as well as able to create higher investment, and can manage their employees more efficient. Demerjian et al., (2013) found 
that these managers are able to report higher quality earnings and reached the higher value of company. In order words, managers who 
have a higher quality associated with higher earnings quality. These findings are consistent with the premise that the more capable 
managers will have a better ability to make an estimate of the accrual, and this shows that companies can increase their corporate 
value by using managers with higher capabilities. 
 
Douma et.al, (2006) highlights the fact that the impact of foreign institutional investors have a positive and significant impact 
on the performance of the company. In fact, Díaz-Díaz et al., (2008) showed that up to a certain level, foreign ownership will improve 
innovation performance. This is because foreign shareholders have control over decisions that enable their companies determined the 
strategic innovation for the company. In addition, Gurbuz and Aybars (2010) showed that foreign ownership will improve the 
profitability of minority better than domestic ownership. Foreign ownership will enhance the company's financial performance to a 
certain degree. Wu et al., (2012) and Hyang et al., (2012) showed that foreign ownership and foreign directors showed a better 
expertise and independent monitoring management. However, Duc and Thi (2013) shows the negative impact of foreign ownership on 
corporate performance, while the positive impact of foreign ownership on the leverage. 
 
Wild (1996) and Klein (2002) described the positive and significant correlation between the formation of audit committees 
and the quality of accounting earnings and there is a negative relationship between the independence of audit committees with 
abnormal accruals. Unlike, Lin et al., (2006) who found that there is a negative and significant relationship between the independence 
of the audit committee as measured by the percentage of independent directors in the audit committee with the restatement of 
earnings. Chan and Li (2008) explain that the trend of an increasing number of independent directors continue to grow over the last 20 
years, but the definition of "independent" is still much varied. Nevertheless, the independence of the audit committee will increase the 
value of the company when the board of directors comprising a majority of independent directors.  
 
According to Baxter and Cotter (2009), the establishment of an audit committee reduces earnings management intentionally, 
but not mistakes on accrual estimation. Pucheta-Martínez and García-Meca (2014) showed that, compared with independent outsiders, 
institutional director may be more effective in overseeing management because they may have more specific knowledge about the 
company. In addition, institutional directors have a relatively close relationship with top management, so that they also can reduce the 
conflict between the board and top management. 
 
Becker et. al. (1998) found that clients of the non-Big Six auditors reported discretionary accruals that increase income 
relatively more than the discretionary accruals reported by the auditor Big Six clients. Contrary to this, Caneghem (2004) found that 
inconsistent findings that turns auditor Big Five and non-Big Five not inhibit the practice of earnings management. Other findings also 
explain that when using alternative proxy for audit quality (which is based on industry expertise auditor), the auditor of  Big Five only 
have a weak relationship with earnings management. Piot and Fetus (2007) also stated that there is no difference in quality between 
the audit public accounting firm with the big five accounting profit. Francis and Yu (2009) apparently showed that the larger the 
auditor's office will provide a higher quality audits. In particular, larger offices are more likely to issue a going concern audit report 
and clients in offices bigger proved to be less aggressive in earnings management behavior. 
 
Gaio and Raposo (2011) show that companies with higher earnings quality will be rated higher in the stock market. Earnings 
quality is very valuable for companies who need access to capital markets to raise funds. Qian et al., (2012) showed that poor earnings 
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quality has a negative impact on the value of the company's cash holdings and positive impact on the level of cash reserves. The 
negative effects of poor earnings quality will neutralize or balance the positive effects of excess cash to the value of the company. 
 
The Theory of Agency 
 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), agency theory based contractual relationship among members in the company, 
where the principal and agent as the main actors. Principals are the ones that give a mandate to the agent to act on behalf of the 
principal, while the agent is a party which was given the mandate by the principal to run the company. Thus, the employment contract 
between principal and agent is an employment contract that explains what should be done manager in running the management of 
invested funds and profit sharing mechanisms in the form of profits, returns and risks that have been approved by both parties. 
 
Agency theory assumes that each individual is motivated by self-interest that can lead to conflict between principal and agent. 
Principal party to a contract for the welfare motivated himself with ever-increasing profitability, while the agents are motivated to 
maximize the economic needs and psychology. 
 
The Theory of Stakeholders 
 
Stakeholders are groups or individuals who can affect or are affected by the activities of the company to achieve its goals 
(Freeman, 1984). According to Fontaine et al., (2006), the main group of stakeholders consisting of customers, employees, local 
communities, suppliers and distributors, and shareholders. Other groups of stakeholder include the media, the general public, business 
partners, generations to come, the generations (the founder of an organization), academics, competitors, private organizations or 
activists, and other representatives of stakeholders which can be either the union or trade association, shareholders (creditors and 
bondholders), governments, regulators and policy makers. 
 
Stakeholder theory focuses on the relationship between organizations with their stakeholders. To maintain and regulate this 
relationship, it is important to do stakeholder management in that the managers must develop and implement processes that satisfy all 
or only groups with an interest in an organization (Zsolnai, 2006). 
 
Stakeholder theory emphasizes the importance of a managerial perspective, because managers tend to focus on the things that 
lead to higher performance based on what is actually measured (Kaplan and Norton, 1992; Sachs and Riihli 2011 in Harrison and 
Wicks, 2013). In addition to focusing on economic performance, stakeholders measure the broader value of the company at the 
company. 
 
III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
The relationship between variables in this study are based on two main theories, namely the theory of agency and the theory 
of stakeholders  as well as previous studies, and rationalization in order to establish a theoretical model of the framework. Picture 1 
exhibits the theoretical Framework of the effect of Managerial Capabilities on the Quality of Earnings and the Value of the firms 
 
 
 
 Picture 1.  The theoretical Framework of the effect of Managerial Capabilities on  
       the Quality of Earnings and the Value of the firms 
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Hypothesis 
 
Managerial Ability, Quality And Value Company Earnings 
 
The ability of managers to manage the company expected to form judgments and estimates are accurate because more 
managers know the state of the company, as well as more able to synthesize the information that is reliable to estimate the future that 
can be used to report higher earnings quality (Libby and Luft 1993). Demerjian et al., (2013) examined the effect of managerial ability 
of the quality of earnings. Managerial skills mentioned in the study is the managerial capacity in the areas of finance, i.e how 
efficiently a company in the financial sector relative to other companies in the same industry. The level of relative efficiency of a 
company is described as a result of the ability of a manager. The study found a positive relationship between managerial ability and 
the quality of earnings. In other words, the better the ability of a manager in the financial sector, the profit generated will be more 
qualified. 
 
Further, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) found that the manager has an effect on the choice of the company such as acquisitions 
or research and development expenses, while Aier et al., (2005) showed that CFOs who have expertise in the field of accounting will 
do restatement less. This would make a profit stated in the financial statements give a true picture of the company's operations. While 
Francis et al., (2008) found a strong negative relationship between CEO reputation with the quality of earnings. The better the 
reputation of the CEO, the profit generated will increasingly not qualified. Based on this brief description above, it was formulated the 
following hypotheses: 
 
 
H1: managerial capabilities have a direct influence on the quality of earnings 
 
H2: managerial capabilities have a direct influence on value 
      company 
 
Foreign Ownership, Quality And Value Company Earnings 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) asserted that in order to address the agency problem can be made by aligning the ownership 
structure. In various studies, the ownership structure emerged as an important factor affecting the performance of the company. 
However, empirical evidence shows mixed results (see, Morck et al., 1988; Margaritis and Psillaki 2010 in and Thi Duc, 2013). 
 
Foreign ownership has plays an important role in the economies of developing countries due to a sharp increase in foreign 
investment. Duc and Thi (2013) also found foreign owners help companies reduce agency problems and can increase the value of the 
company. Foreign ownership becomes valuable when foreign owners is the part of the monitoring shareholder because it can function 
better oversight. Thus, foreign ownership has a strong influence on the quality of corporate profits. 
 
Moreover, Hyang et al., (2012) also confirm that foreign ownership and foreign directors will provide independent 
monitoring of the management. Management control over foreign investors have relationships with the increase in the value of the 
company. In line with the above, Alipour (2013) also states that the concentration of ownership is positively related to the ROE. 
Similarly, Klein et al., (2005) in Pathak et al., (2012) argued that the presence of dispersed ownership will increase expectations of a 
positive relationship between the size of corporate governance and company performance. Based on this brief description, it is 
hypothesized as follows.  
 
H3: foreign ownership has a direct influence on the quality of earnings 
 
H4: foreign ownership has a direct influence on the value of the company 
  
Independent Audit Committee, Quality And Value Company Earnings 
 
A good monitoring process will reduce the discretion of accrual and ultimately improve the accuracy of financial statements 
and then increase confidence in the financial statements (Gaver and Paterson, 2001). Klein (2002) states that the company established 
an independent audit committee reported profits containing smaller discretionary accruals compared to companies that do not form an 
independent audit committee. 
 
Carcello and Neal (2003); Felo, Krishnamurthy and SOLIERI (2003) in Chan and Li (2008) found a positive relationship 
between audit committee independence and quality of financial reporting. The existence of an independent audit committee is 
essential for the management of the company, especially in maintaining the credibility of the financial statements as well as monitor 
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the actions of managers. With the monitoring of the performance of the company will increase and will ultimately increase the value 
of the company. 
 
Piot and Fetus (2007) found a decrease in the normal accrual when an audit committee exists, but the independence of the 
audit committee does not significantly influence the measurement of the accrual. The results also explain that the audit committee to 
act as the improved quality of audits within the company but the rules of independence and audit committee assignments in the future 
must be clearly defined. This brief description lead to the following  hypotheses: 
 
H5: an independent audit committee has a direct influence on the quality of earnings 
 
H6: an independent audit committee has a direct influence on value 
      company 
 
Quality Audit, Quality and the Value of Earnings 
 
Becker et al., (1998) showed that a large audit firm will provide a better audit quality. This is based on the consideration that 
a large audit firm has a team working with the knowledge and technology that is better than the small audit firms. Becker et al., (1998) 
states that the accrual discretionary will tend to decrease when the auditor comes from large audit firms. Thus, earnings quality will be 
better because of the financial reporting process complies with the standards that should be applied. 
 
The findings above were confirmed by Herrbach (2001) in that the financial audit by an independent auditor is monitoring 
tools that aim to balance the asymmetry of information between managers and stakeholders of the company. Nevertheless, it is 
important to recognize that the audit report is only valuable for users of financial statements if the quality of audits performed really 
well. Large public accounting firm providing audit services which tend to have a higher quality than the small public accounting firm. 
 
Similarly, Francis and Yu (2009) also states that the auditor larger office will provide higher quality audit. This is because a 
large auditor's office also has the potential to produce a higher quality audit because they have a larger internal training, networking 
opportunities and wider. Based on the brief description above, formulated the following hypotheses: 
 
H7: audit quality has a direct influence on the quality of earnings 
 
H8: audit quality has a direct impact on the value of the company 
 
 
Company Earnings Quality and The Value 
 
The company's main purpose is to increase the company's value. Agency conflict that resulted in the management of 
opportunistic properties may result in lower earnings quality. The low quality of earnings will result in decisions that one of the users, 
such as investors and creditors, so that the value of the company will be reduced.  Gaio and Raposo (2011) indicates that there is a 
positive correlation between the quality of earnings and corporate value. This is consistent with the idea that the quality of earnings is 
very valuable for companies who need access to capital markets to raise funds. While Qian et al., (2012) reported poor earnings 
quality will worsen asymmetry between the company's internal information with external stakeholders the company resulting decline 
in the value of the company in the eyes of investors. Based on the brief description above, formulated the following hypotheses: 
 
H9: earnings quality has a direct influence on the value of the company 
 
IV. RESEARCH METHODS 
The population in this study are 312 non-financial companies listed in the Indonesian Stock Exchange from 2010 - 2014. This 
is in line with Pucheta-Martínez and García-Meca (2014) as well as Gaio and Raposo (2011), which focuses on non-financial 
companies with due consideration to general financial companies are under special supervision of a government authority of the 
financial sector which limits the company's accounting practices. The sample in this study was determined by using purposive 
sampling method based on certain criteria. Under the terms of sampling, companies are eligible to be used as samples in this study 
only 178 companies from years 2010-2014. 
 
In terms of the operational definitions, managerial abilityis defined as the ability of the management company that can form 
accurate judgments and estimates with respect to the company's efficiency, reliable and synthesize information to estimate the future. 
Measurement variables managerial capacity refers to the study Demerjian et al (2012; 2013) as follows: 
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Firm Efficiency = α + β1ln (Total Assets) + β2 Market Share + β3  Free Cash Flow + β4 In (age)  + β5 Business Segment 
Concentration + β6  Foreign Currency Indicator + εi 
 
Where : 
Total Asset = value of total assets of the company at the end of the fiscal year 
Market Share = net profit margin, i.e the percentage of profit on sales 
Free Cash Flow Indicator = 1 if the company does not have the value of free cash flow negative and 0 if the company has a value of 
negative free cash flow 
Firm Age = length of companies listed on the stock exchange 
Business Segment Concentration = ratio between sales segment with total sales 
Foreign Currency Indicator = 1 if the company does not have the foreign currency adjustments at the end of the year and 0 if the 
company has foreign currency adjustments at the end of the year. 
 
While the Firm Efficiency by Demerjian et al., (2012) will be calculated by the following formula: 
                                                            Sales 
Maxvθ = ------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------ 
                   COGS + SG & A + PPE + Ops Lease + R & D + Goodwill + Other Intan 
 
The total efficiency of the company is estimated using an output that is sales revenue  and seven input (COGS, SG & A, PPE, Ops 
Lease, R & D, Goodwill and Other Intan). Total sales revenue is output with consideration of the company's main goal is to generate 
sales. The most successful companies are those that generate maximum sales at the lowest cost. 
 
Where : 
Sales: the total amount of sales 
GoGs: the total amount of goods sold 
SG & A: the total amount of selling expenses and administration 
PPE: the net amount of property, plant and equipment 
OpsLease: net operating leasing 
R & D: the amount of research and development costs 
Goodwill: the amount of goodwill 
Other Intan: the amount of other intangible assets 
 
In terms of foreign ownership, this  is defined as a proportion of the company's shares are owned by individuals, legal entities, 
government, as well as the status of its parts abroad (Dan Thi Duc, 2013). The mathematical formula is : 
 
                                                    Shares owned by foreigners 
           Foreign Ownership = ----------------------------------------------- ----------- 
                                                               Number of shares outstanding 
 
The estimation of independent audit committee is defined as  a committee which monitors the financial reporting process by 
management to improve the credibility of financial statements. The audit committee is responsible for overseeing the financial reports, 
overseeing the external audit, and observe the internal control system including the internal audit (Bhutta and Shah, 2014). This can be 
formulated as: 
        
                                                                    The number of independent audit committee 
             Independent Audit Committee = ---------------------------------------------- - 
                                                                   Total number of audit committee 
 
 
 
In terms of quality audit, this study is based on the audit by the public accounting firm (KAP) Big 4 and non-big 4. These 
measurements will be regressing frequency auditor issued a modified audit opinion on audit quality (Hanwen, 2011) were measured 
by using logistic regression as follows : 
 
MAOit Audit = φ0 + φ1 AUDit + φ2 SIZE it+ φ3 LEVit+ φ4SIZEit+ φ5INVit + φ6 RECit+ Φ7 BMit + φ7 ST /PTit + φ8 ROAit + φ9 
SOEit + φ10 OWNERit + Φ11 INDIRit 
 
Where  : 
MAO = 1 if the company receives a modified opinion and zero otherwise 
AUD = 1 if the firm is audited by the big four and zero otherwise 
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SIZE = the size of the company in the form Ln of total assets 
LEV = leverage (total debt / total assets) 
INV = inventory divided by total assets 
REC = receivables divided by total assets 
BM = book-to-market ratio (the book value of equity / equity market value) 
ST / PT = 1 if the company loses two consecutive years and 0 if not 
ROA = return on assets (profit before taxes / total assets) 
SOE = government ownership 
OWNER = presentation monitoring stake 
INDR = percentage of independent directors to total board 
 
The Quality of earnings in this study refers to the definition made by Penman, 2001 in Abdelghany (2005) where a quality 
earnings are profits that can reflect the sustainable of earnings in the future. The smaller the ratio between CFO (cash flow from 
operations) and net income gives an overview profit more qualified. This small ratio indicates more efficient use of cash resources to 
generate profits provide an overview of company performance better. 
 
                                                      Cash Flow From Operations (CFO) (i, t) 
     Quality of Income Ratio = --------------------------------------------- ------------- 
                                                               Net Operating Income (i, t) 
 
For the value of the company was defined as the ratio of market value to the replacement value of the assets of the company. 
A higher value greater than one indicates that the company has a good value. The company's value is measured using Tobin's Q in 
accordance with the study Gaio And Raposo (2011) can be calculated using the following formula: 
 
                     BVA i, t + MVE i, t - BVE i, t 
        Qit = -------------------------------------- 
                                 BVA i, t 
 
Where : 
Q it = the value of the company 
BVA = book value of total assets 
MVE = closing market price x number of shares of common stock outstanding 
BVE = book value of equity 
 
The estimation method used in this context is by using the path analysis with the help of software AMOS (Analysis of 
Moment Structure). 
 
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
As mentioned that the population used in this study are all non-financial companies listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange 
(BEI) in succession from 2010 to 2014 consisting of 312 companies. However, of this population, the company selected by random 
sampling method was 178 companies with 890 samples observation. This sample has gone through the process of testing under 
various assumptions conformance test model (Goodness-of-Fit Model).  
 
Testing was conducted at the time of surgery AMOS runs. There are two tests for normality, the normality of uni-variate and 
multivariate normality. A data distribution can be considered normal if the value skewness CR or CR kurtosis value is smaller than the 
critical value table + 1.96 with a 0.05 significance level (p-value 5%). See Table  1 below for the result of univariate and multivariate 
normality test with AMOS program. 
 
Table 1 
Normality Test Results 
Variable min Max skew c.r. kurtosis c.r. 
Managerial ability  0,686 1,059 -0,099 -1,026 0,630 3,274 
Foreign ownership 0,000 0,991 0,960 9,985 -0,240 -1,246 
Audit Independent Committee 0,000 0,667 0,147 1,530 2,494 12,967 
Audit quality 0,000 1,000 0,465 4,837 -1,784 -9,275 
Earning Quality -3,276 4,335 -0,178 -1,856 1,817 9,450 
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Firm’s value 0,172 4,044 1,226 12,747 1,245 6,474 
Multivariate         -0,075 -0,098 
Source :  based on authors calculation  (2015) 
 
 
From Table 1, it can be seen by using Univariate analysis, it can be noted that there are variables that have value CR 
skewness and kurtosis that are greater than the critical value tables + 1.96. This can be concluded that the distribution of univariate 
data is not normal at the level of 0.05 significance level (p-value 5%).  However, if the test was analyzed by multivariate, note that CR 
kurtosis of -0.098 is smaller than the critical value tables + 1.96. It can be concluded in multivariate data distribution is normal. 
Kline (2011: 60) argues that if the multivariate test result a normal distribution, then the univariate test can be considered  
normal too. While testing all univariate variables which are non-normal cannot guarantee that multivariate testing is also non-normal. 
Thus, it can be concluded that the data in this study are normally distributed, as the distribution of multivariate variables are normal. 
Hence, the assumption of normality in this study have been met. 
 
After testing the suitability of the model (Goodness-of-Fit Model) above, the study then conducted  testing against the 
hypothesis by using a regression model in path analysis to predict the relationship between exogenous and endogenous variables. 
Based on the results of the analysis of pathways, it was found the standardized path coefficient structural equation this study, as shown 
in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 
Estimates of The Standardized path coefficient of structural equation 
Variable 
Estimate 
Coeff.  S.E P Description  
Managerial ability on Earning 
quality 0,147 0,702 *** Significant 
Foreign ownership on the quality 
of earnings  0,044 0,141 0,248 In significant  
Independent audit committee 
on the quality of earnings  -0,155 0,343 *** Significant 
Audit Quality on Earnings quality  0,098 0,083 0,010 Significant 
Managerial abilityon the firms’ 
value 0,086 0,447 0,020 Significant 
Foreign ownership on firms’ value  -0,099 0,089 0,007 Significant 
Independent audit committee on 
firms’ value  -0,030 0,219 0,413 Insignificant 
Audit quality on firms’ value  0,338 0,053 *** Significant 
Earning quality on firms’ value  -0,032 0,025 0,397 Insignificant 
Source : calculated by the authors (2015) 
 
 
Estimate of the Effects of Mediating variable using Sobel Test 
 
To test the effect of indirect or mediating role of the quality of earnings in relation to the managerial ability of the company's 
value, the Sobel test is used. The results found that there is no mediating role of the variable quality of earnings in mediating the 
relationship managerial capabilities to the company's value (see Table 3).  
 
 
Table 3 
Estimation of the effect of mediating variable using Sobel Test 
Variables Estimate value Standard p value of 
  
 
Error Sobel Test 
Effects of managerial ability Firms value 
via earning quality  2,711 ; -0,021 0,702 ; 0,025 0,41175606 
Effects of foreign ownership ---> Firms’ value 
via earnings quality  0,163 ; -0,021  0,141 ; 0,025 0,49679110 
Effects of independent audit committee ---> 
Firms’ value via earnings quality  -1,390 ; -0,021 0,343 ; 0,025 0,41078327 
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Effects of audit quality  ---> Firms’ value  via 
Earnings quality 0,215 ; -0,021 0,083 ; 0,025 0,42426851 
Source : Author Estimation (2015) 
 
Based on calculations usin Sobel test as shown at Table 3, it  can be explained that the indirect effect of  managerial ability 
on the value of the company has a p-value (two-tailed probability) of Sobel test amounted to 0.411> 0.05 alpha. The indirect effect of 
foreign ownership of the value of the company has a p-value (two-tailed probability) Sobel test amounted to 0.496> 0.05 alpha.  The 
indirect effect of the independent audit committee on the value of the company has a p-value (two-tailed probability) Sobel test 
amounted to 0.424> 0.05 alpha. The indirect effect of the quality of audits on the company's value has a p-value (two-tailed 
probability) Sobel test amounted to 0.410> 0.05 alpha. These findings suggests that the variable of the quality of earnings in this study 
is the type No. Mediation. In other words, the variable of the  quality of earnings fail to function as an intervening variable that 
mediates the effect of managerial capability, foreign ownership, independent audit committees and audit quality on firm value. 
 
Hypothesis testing 
 
Hypothesis testing is done by comparing the p-value with a significance level (alpha) of 0.05. If the p-value <alpha 0.05 then 
H0 is rejected and H1 accepted. Conversely, if the p-value> 0.05 alpha, H0 is accepted and H1 rejected. The results of path coefficient 
analysis and Sobel testing are shown at Table 4. 
 
 
Table4 
 
Results of Hypotheses Testing  
Variable 
Results of Hypothesis 
test  
H1: Effects of managerial ability on the quality of earnings Accepted 
H2: Effects of managerial ability on firms’ value Accepted 
H3: Effects of foreign ownership on earnings quality Rejected 
H4: Effects of Foreign ownership on the firms’ value Accepted  
H5: Effects of independent audit committee on the earning quality Accepted 
H6: Effects of independent audit committee on forms’ value Rejected  
H7: Effects of audit quality on earnings quality  Accepted  
H8: Effects of auidit quality on firms’ value Accepted  
H9: Effects of earning quality on firms’ value Rejected  
Source: Authors’ Estimation (2015) 
 
 
Effects of Managerial Abilities on the Quality of Earnings 
 
As shown at Table 4, the results of testing the hypothesis 1 (H1) indicates that the managerial ability has a positive and 
significant direct effect on the quality of earnings. The results are consistent with the Libby and Luft (1993) and Demerjian et al., 
(2013) who found that managerial ability will improve the quality of earnings. This indicates that the better the ability of a manager in 
the financial sector, the profit generated more qualified. Managerial skills possessed by managers include knowledge and experience 
of the company's activities. The experience and knowledge generally includes work processes of managers in solving the problem and 
find ways to increase revenue in the future by using the lowest input. In addition, each manager needs to undertake an evaluation of 
each of the selected alternative in managing the company input for each effort can provide cash inflows in the future for the company. 
 
The results are also consistent with the concept of agency proposed by Fama (1980), where the need for "efficient contracts" 
between management and shareholders. According to Fama (1980),  the control of large companies can be efficient in the form of 
economic organization. In a modern company, Fama (1980) stated that there are two functions which are usually connected between 
employers-management, i.e. the risk that exists naturally and "contract" called the company. Increased competition, making the 
company should evolve over the device in the organization in order to efficiently monitor the performance of the entire company. 
 
Effects of Managerial Ability on Firm’s  Value 
 
In terms of the effect of managerial ability on the firm’s value, the study found that managerial ability has a positive and 
significant impact on the value of the company. The results are consistent with Bertrand and Schoar (2003) who found that managers 
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who have better skills in decision making and financial investment will have a permanent effect on corporate governance. While Aier 
et al., (2005) found that companies that have a CFO with more work experience as CFO, MBA or CPA significantly less likely to 
declare the restatement of earnings (restatement). Thus, the market confidence in the company is not reduced. 
 
Management as the part of the firm that runs the company's activities need to safeguard the interests of its stakeholders. To 
maintain and regulate the relationship between management and stakeholders, it takes stakeholder management, where managers with 
the knowledge, experience and ability to be able to formulate and implement business processes that satisfy all interest groups within 
an organization. The process that should be undertaken by the manager was in the form of decision-making and business strategy to 
boost confidence in the company's global market. Each activity carried out by managers should be measured, recorded and reported in 
the annual financial statements as a form of management accountability to its stakeholders. 
 
The findings are consistent with Freeman (2004), which states that managers and other workers together have an employment 
contract. However, managers with the knowledge, experience and ability have an obligation to safeguard the welfare of the company 
by making decisions and business strategies that can benefit the stakeholders. Managers must constantly seek to improve its ability to 
use any insight and information to create better corporate value. In essence, the perspective of the stakeholders is to create a higher 
level of prosperity for the stakeholders (stakeholders) in the broad sense. 
 
Effects of Foreign Ownership on the Quality of Earnings 
 
Foreign ownership has no effect on the quality of earnings. Results of this study are inconsistent with Douma et al., (2006), 
Díaz-Díaz et al., (2008), Gurbuz and Aybars (2010) and Wu et al., (2012) who found that foreign ownership can improve performance 
and quality of corporate profits.  This finding was also inconsistent with the statement Gurbuz and Aybars (2010) which show that 
foreign ownership minorities have better performance than ownership of the majority of domestic and foreign ownership. Gurbuz and 
Aybars (2010) show that foreign ownership is worse than the majority domestic ownership. But the results of this study are consistent 
with the Duc and Thi (2013) study conducted in Vietnam who found that the negative impact of foreign ownership on company 
performance. This result suggests that the role of foreign ownership controls do not work in companies listed Indonesian Stock 
Exchange. 
 
In the perspective of Agency Theory, and Thi Duc (2013) explains that foreign ownership can replace debt and help 
companies perform better control by reducing agency cost of equity by the supervisory manager. However, this can only happen when 
the foreign shareholders can create an efficient mechanism of control in the company. Thus, foreign ownership in this study had no 
effect on the quality of corporate profits do not indicate the concentration of foreign ownership, so that the control process cannot 
function properly. 
 
Effects of Foreign Ownership on Corporate Value 
 
The value of the company shows that foreign ownership has negative direct and significant effect on firm value. The results 
are inconsistent with Chibber and Majumdar (1999), Djankov and Hoekman (2000), Dhar (1988) in Douma et al., (2006) and Hyang 
et al., (2012) who found that the management control through foreign investors and board membership tends to reduce the increase in 
leverage when foreign directors representing the private interests of foreign shareholders. The influence of moderate due to the 
concentration of foreign ownership has a relationship with the increase in the value of the company. 
 
The results are inconsistent with the stakeholder theory which states that the company's performance should tend to increase 
when there is a good control in the company. Conglomeration of ownership associated with the family to make a right control of the 
company in full accordance with the interests of their group. Unfair treatment makes the company does not have the ability to create 
value together on a number of dimensions for the welfare of all stakeholders at large. 
 
Effects of Independent Audit Committee on the Quality of Earnings 
 
For the Hypothesis 5 (H5), the study  showed that independent audit committees have a negative and significant direct effect 
on the quality of earnings. The results are in consistent with the Wild (1996), Pucheta-Martínez and García-Meca (2014) who found a 
positive and significant relationship between the formation of audit committees and the quality of accounting earnings. Baxter and 
Cotter (2009) states that the audit committee be composed of independent individuals  who do not involved in the day-to-day tasks of 
management to manage the company and have the experience to carry out the oversight function effectively. One of the main reasons 
for this independence is to maintain the integrity and objective view in the report, as well as the preparation of recommendations made 
by the audit committee, as an independent individual tends to be fair and impartial and objective in handling a problem.  This indicates 
that the greater number of independent audit committees will lead to less quality of earnings. However, the existence of an audit 
committee will hinder the fraud made in the company. 
 
Effects of Independent Audit Committee on Corporate Value 
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Results of testing the hypothesis 6 (H6) with respect to the value of the company shows that the independent audit committee 
has no effect on firm value. Results of this study are inconsistent with Chan and Li (2008) who showed that the independence of the 
audit committee will increase the value of the company when the board of directors comprising a majority of independent directors. 
Although the trend of an increasing number of independent audit committees continue to grow over the last 20 years, but the 
definition of "independent" is still much varied. When companies controlled by families and groups, the independence of the audit 
committee would be very questionable. Besides the Independent Audit Committee generally consists of individuals who have the duty 
and other work outside the company and only meet regularly without seeing and directly involved in the activities of the company. 
  
Effects of Audit Quality on the Quality of Earnings 
 
The quality of audit has a positive and significant direct effect on the quality of earnings. The results are consistent with 
Becker et al., (1998), Francis and Yu (2009) who found that the Big Six auditor has a higher quality audit of the non-Big Six auditor. 
Large audit firms generally provide audit with higher quality with a higher level of independence compared to small audit firms. This 
stems from the fact that the major audit firms are less dependent on their clients due to the fact that they have more clients that tend 
not to be under the pressure of clients and are able to report their audit findings better. The findings are also consistent with DeFond 
and Jiambalvo (1993) which confirms that the conflict between the auditor-client generally associated with the practice increased 
revenue and if the external auditor is the public accounting firm of the world, the audit firm is more likely to resist the pressure of 
managerial and defend his opinion that independent. 
 
Effects of the Audit Quality on the Corporate Value 
 
Also, the study found that quality of audit has a positive and significant direct effect on firm value. This finding is consistent 
with Francis and Yu (2009) which shows that the larger the auditor's office will provide a higher quality audits. In particular, the larger 
the firm is more likely to issue a going concern audit report and clients on larger KAP proved to be less aggressive in earnings 
management behavior so that information reported earnings depict the actual condition of the company. 
 
In the perspective of stakeholder theory, Freeman (1984) and Zsolnai (2006) focuses on the relationship between 
organizations with their stakeholders. To maintain and regulate the relationship needs to be a process of external scrutiny of the 
processes within the organization that can bring increased confidence of stakeholders of the organization. Audit process conducted by 
a large KAP will provide positive expectations to the market that the company has been assessed as appropriate. The market will give 
a positive reaction in the form of rising stock prices that resulted in increased market value of the company's equity. Thus, the value of 
the company will be better in the future. 
 
Effects of the Earnings Quality on the Corporate Values 
 
The earnings quality has no effect on firm value. This findings was inconsistent with Sloan (1996), Feng (2011), Gaio and 
Raposo (2011) who found that companies experiencing an increase in reported income and innovation management to make earnings 
reported to have high quality, and hence the level of investment in the company will increase.  This indicates that the profits from the 
company tend to be unqualified so it is unable to increase the value of equity of the company. This finding is also consistent with Qian 
et al., (2012) which states that poor earnings quality will worsen asymmetry between the company's internal information with external 
stakeholders that resulting the decline in the value of the company in the eyes of investors. Most companies in Indonesia evolved from 
family ownership, in which the monitoring shareholder is the group of individuals, families and groups of family members. Party who 
monitoring shareholder have full control of all the information in connection with the company. So that the asymmetry of information 
that occurs between the agent and the principal in the perspective of agency theory introduced by Jensen and Meckling (1976) has 
been transformed into the asymmetry of information between the monitoring interest (monitoring shareholder) to the non-monitoring 
interest (non-monitoring shareholders). 
 
Role of Mediating variables in affecting the Earnings Quality on the Firm’s Value 
 
In terms of the role of the mediating factor, the study found that there was no role of mediating variables earnings quality that 
connects the exogenous variables in this case the managerial capability, foreign ownership, independent audit committees and audit 
quality by endogenous variables in this case the value of the company. Quality of earnings in this study failed to be a mediating 
variable. This indicates that investors in the Indonesian market tend to not pay attention to the process of resource usage activity on 
the company in generating profits. Investors believe more information on the external market in making investment decisions. On the 
other hand, there are problems associated with investor protection. This problem makes the investor will rely on short-term investment 
gains rather than on long-term investment. As a result, sustainable profits are not taken into consideration in making investment 
decisions. 
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VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This study aimed to examine the direct and indirect effects of managerial ability and control structures in this case foreign 
ownership, independent audit committees and audit quality on the quality of earnings and corporate value. The study found that (1) 
managerial ability has a positive and significant direct effect on the quality of earnings; (2) managerial ability has a positive and 
significant direct effect on firm value; (3) Foreign ownership has no effect on the quality of earnings; (4) Foreign ownership has a 
direct, negative and significant effect on firm value; (5) an independent audit committee has a direct, negative and significant effect on 
the quality of earnings. (6) the independent audit committee has no effect on firm value; (7) Quality audits have a positive and 
significant direct effect on the quality of earnings; (8) Quality audits have a positive and significant direct effect on firm value; (9) The 
quality of earnings has no effect on firm value; Finally, the results of this study found that there was no role of mediating variables 
earnings quality that connects the exogenous variables in this case the managerial capability, foreign ownership, independent audit 
committees and audit quality by endogenous variables in this case the value of the company. 
The theoretical implications of this study strengthen the agency theory proposed by Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama 
(1980), Eisenhardt (1989), which explains that the need for "efficient contracts" between management and shareholders. The results 
are also  consistent with the concept of stakeholder theory put forward by Freeman (1984), Clarkson (1995), Donaldson and Preston 
(1995), Freeman (2004), Fointaine et al., (2006), Zsolnai (2006) and Harrison and Wicks (2013), which asserts that the value creation 
process for companies is generally reflected in the management of the company's operational activities. The practical implications of 
this research are expected to give due consideration to the company in order to maintain the continuity of their business by using 
resources efficiently and effectively for the welfare of broad stakeholders.  
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